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Abstract. The Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model has been
widely applied to a single domain in which users are known to the ad-
ministrative unit of that domain, beforehand. However, the application
of the conventional RBAC model for remote access control scenarios is
not straightforward. In such scenarios, the access requestor is outside of
the provider domain and thus, the user population is heterogeneous and
dynamic. Here, the main challenge is to automatically assign users to
appropriate roles of the provider domain. Trust management has been
proposed as a supporting technique to solve the problem of remote access
control. The key idea is to establish a mutual trust between the requestor
and provider based on credentials they exchange. However, a credential
doesn’t convey any information about the behavior of its holder during
the time it is being used. Furthermore, in terms of privileges granted to
the requestor, existing trust management systems are either too restric-
tive or not restrictive enough. In this paper, we propose a new dynamic
user-role assignment approach for remote access control, where a stranger
requests for access from a provider domain. Our approach has two advan-
tages compared to the existing dynamic user-role assignment techniques.
Firstly, it addresses the principle of least privilege without degrading the
efficiency of the access control system. Secondly, it takes into account
both credentials and the past behavior of the requestor in such a way
that he cannot compensate for the lack of necessary credentials by having
a good past behavior.
1 Introduction
An access control system is a component of a multi-user system which mediates
requests to resources of the system and makes decisions about whether or not
they should be granted. Classical access control models , namely Discretionary
Access control (DAC), Mandatory Access Control (MAC) and Role-Based Ac-
cess Control (RBAC) have been mainly applied to single domains. The main
characteristic of a single domain is that users are known to the administrative
unit of that domain, beforehand. Among such models, RBAC has absorbed more
attention, both in practice [17] and research [7]. This is due to the fact that firstly,
RBAC can be well adapted to organizations where each role corresponds to a
job function. Secondly, RBAC greatly simplifies the management of authoriza-
tions within a system, because a group of subjects are usually given the same
permissions.
Contrary to the problem of access control in a single domain, in remote
access control scenarios the access requestor is not registered in the provider
domain and thus, the user population is heterogeneous and dynamic. Though
the problem of access control has been an active research line for many years, we
didn’t find a clear description for different possible scenarios. We address this
issue by presenting a systematic overview of the different possible access control
scenarios. In particular, we are interested in a remote access control scenario
where a stranger who is not registered in any domain requests for access from
a provider domain. Despite the above-mentioned advantages, the application
of RBAC for such a scenario is not straightforward. The main issue here is to
dynamically assign appropriate domain-specific roles to strangers.
Trust management [2, 3, 9, 13] has been proposed as a supporting approach
to solve the problem of remote access control. Here, the key idea is to establish
a mutual trust between the requestor and provider based on credentials they ex-
change. Each credential, issued by a trusted authority, binds an attribute to its
holder. Each domain regulates accesses to its resources and services by asking the
requestor to present a set of credentials. Although credential based trust man-
agement systems are promising for the described remote access control scenario,
they don’t take into consideration the behavior of strangers using credentials.
A credential doesn’t give any information about the behavior of its holder dur-
ing the past uses of that credential. In other words, existing trust management
systems bind a binary trust to strangers regardless of their past behavior.
In order to benefit from the advantages of both RBAC and trust management
systems in an open environment, a few models have been proposed [5, 10, 20].
The main issue that such models address is to automatically assign strangers to
appropriate domain- specific roles, based on credentials they present. In particu-
lar, the TrustBAC model [5] tries to address the above-mentioned problem with
the notion of credentials. In this model, automatic user-role assignment is based
on not only credentials of a stranger but its past behavior and recommendations.
However, this approach has two drawbacks. First, it doesn’t respect the principle
of least privilege. When a stranger sends his request for access, based on the pre-
sented credentials, his past behavior and user recommendations he is assigned
a trust level which is associated with some roles. Consequently, the requestor
becomes a member of all such roles and authorized to exercise all permissions
associated to them. This exposes the system to the risk of granting strangers
excessive permissions that they don’t require for the requested transaction. The
second drawback of this approach is that a user who lacks some necessary cre-
dentials to become qualified to assume a highly privileged role might still be able
to become a member of that role. This may happen if an unqualified user has
shown a good past behavior and/or received good recommendations.
The contribution of the paper is twofold. First, it gives a systematic overview
of the different possible access control scenarios where the requestor can be in-
side or outside of the provider domain. The second and main contribution of
the paper is that it gives a novel dynamic user-role assignment approach which
addresses the identified shortcomings of the TrustBAC model. In particular, we
address the principle of least privilege by assigning a stranger the least priv-
ileged role to which the requested permission has been assigned. In addition,
in our approach we require a stranger to be both qualified and trusted for the
requested role (permission). In this way, a stranger cannot compensate for the
lack of qualifications by having a good past behavior and/or receiving good
recommendations.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 3 we describe
different access control scenarios. In Section 4 we present our dynamic user-role
assignment approach for the remote access control scenario, where a stranger
requests for access from a provider domain. In Section 5 we discuss about the
proposed approach. In Section 6 the state-of-the-art application of RBAC in
other access control scenarios is given. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Related Work
In this section we represent the background work that has influenced our work.
We start with representing the basic and hierarchical RBAC and then describe
the dynamic user-role assignment and role-based trust management framework
RT [11, 12, 14].
2.1 Role-Based Access Control
Role-based access control has been the subject of research for many years, result-
ing in several different models such as the RBAC96 model [18], the role graph
model [16] and the ANSI RBAC standard model [19]. At the core of all these
models is the concept of role, which connects a set of users to a set of permis-
sions, in a way that users assigned to a role acquire permissions of that role.
The main motivation behind RBAC is that it greatly simplifies the management
of authorizations within a system, due to the fact that a group of subjects are
usually given the same permissions. More elaborated RBAC models utilize the
concept of role hierarchy, through which membership inheritance and permission
inheritance are added to the basic model. In the hierarchical RBAC models, the
role hierarchy is a partial order, in which a more senior role inherits all permis-
sions associated to its junior roles. Furthermore, each member of a more senior
role is also a member of all of its junior roles. Therefore, hierarchical RBAC even
further simplifies the management of authorizations by reducing the number of
explicit user-role and permission-role assignments. In the rest of the paper, we
confine the interpretation of RBAC to the ANSI RBAC standard model.
2.2 Dynamic User-Role Assignment
There are a few existing techniques which address the problem of dynamic user-
role assignment [1, 4, 10, 11, 12]. Such techniques try to automate the user-role
assignment administrative task, which is motivated by the following two scenar-
ios. The first scenario is a large-scale organization where the number of users
can be in the hundreds of thousands or millions. In such an environment, the
manual user-role assignment becomes a cumbersome task. The second scenario is
an open distributed system where the user population is dynamic and the iden-
tity of all users is unknown beforehand. In such systems, the manual user-role
assignment is almost impossible. In this paper, we are dealing with the latter
scenario.
In a single domain of control, dynamic user-role assignment is based on the
policies defined by the administrative unit of that domain. In order to assign
an appropriate role to a user, such policies require different information of the
user which depends on the applied dynamic user-role assignment model. In [1]
Al-Kahtani et al. proposed the Rule-Based RBAC or RB-RBAC. In this model,
the administrative unit of an enterprise, defines a set of rules to automatically
assign users to roles. Such rules, take into consideration two elements: the cre-
dentials of the user and the constraints on using roles. However, this model takes
into account the trustworthiness of neither the credential issuers nor the users
regarding their past behavior.
This is also the case for the existing credential-based trust management sys-
tems which try to dynamically assign roles to strangers [4, 10, 11, 12]. A creden-
tial may be issued by different authorities. In addition, a credential doesn’t give
any information about the behavior of its holder during the past uses of that
credential. This issue has been addressed to some extent in the TrustBAC model
[5] in which dynamic user-role assignment is based on not only credentials of a
stranger but its past behavior and recommendations. Here, users are assigned to
trust levels which are assigned to roles. The trust level of a user is obtained by
the sum of values extracted from separate trust components for that user, e.g. his
credentials, past behavior in the system and recommendations from other users.
However, as we discussed in the previous section, this model has two drawbacks.
First, it doesn’t respect the principle of least privilege. Second, a stranger who
lacks some necessary credentials to become qualified to assume a highly privi-
leged role might compensate for those credentials by having a good past behavior
and/or receiving good recommendations.
2.3 Role-Based Trust Management Framework (RT)
The main problem that we try to shed light on is also a variant of trust man-
agement system in which a stranger sends its request for access to a provider
domain which applies Role-Based Access Control model. To do so, we apply
the Role-Based Trust Management Framework (RT). The reason that we choose
RT is that it is one of the most influential and successful credential based trust
management systems [6]. RT includes a family of Role Based Trust Management
(TM) languages which RT0 is the simplest member and RT1, RT2, RT3, RT
T ,
RTD are the more sophisticated ones. In the following, we briefly describe RT0
which we use in our dynamic user-role assignment approach.
The main constructs of RT0 are entities, role names and roles. An entity,
denoted by a name starting with an uppercase letter, can be an individual like
Alice, or a domain of control like HospitalA. An entity can define roles, issue
credentials and make access requests. A role name is denoted by a name starting
with a lowercase letter e.g. doctor, nurse and physician are role names. The con-
cept of role is at the core of RT0 and is identified by an entity followed by a role
name, separated by a dot. For example, HospitalA.doctor is a valid role, indi-
cation that HospitalA is the owner of role doctor and is the only authority who
can directly determine its members. Members of a role acquire the permissions
associated to that role. A permission is also represented by a role in RT0 e.g.
HospitalA.readMedicalRecord which is the permission to read a medical record
of hospital A. In RT0, there are four types of credentials that entity A can issue.
For each credential type, the membership of role A.r is defined in a different way.
– Simple Member: A.r ← D.
This credential means A states that D is a member of A.r
– Simple Inclusion: A.r ← B.r1.
This credential means all members of B.r1 are also members of A.r. This
represents a delegation from A to B.
– Linking Inclusion: A.r ← A.r1.r2.
This credential means A.r1 includes B.r2 for every B that is a member of
A.r1. This shows a delegation from A to all members of A.r1.
– Intersection Inclusion: A.r ← B1.r1 ∩B2.r2.
This credential means A states that A.r includes any entity who is a member
of both B1.r1 and B2.r2.
It should be noted that a policy is a finite set of credentials of the above
form. For the complete introduction of RT0 we refer the reader to [6].
3 The Scenarios
In this section, we present four different access control scenarios. We start with
entities and assumptions on which the scenarios rely. We then continue with
brief description of each scenario.
Entities
– Access Control Point (ACP)- The system entity that is in charge of the whole
access control process, including definition of policies, evaluation of policies
and enforcing the authorization decision.
– Past Behavior Authority (PBA)- The system entity that, in a specific appli-
cation context, issues certificates of the past behavior for both subjects and
domains.
– Attribute Authority (AA)- The system entity that issues attribute certifi-
cates for both individual subjects and domains.
Assumptions
– Each domain regulates accesses to its own resources using the hierarchical
RBAC model, in which user-role assignment can be automatically performed
based on the policies defined in RT0.
– There are attribute authorities and past behavior authorities which, for both
individual subjects and domains, issue attribute certificates and certificates
of their past behavior, respectively.
Depending on the relationship between the requestor and the provider, there
are four different access control scenarios which are depicted in Fig. 1 and de-
scribed in the following.
  
 	
	  	
	 
  	  	
	 
 
fffi
  
fffi
fl 	
	  	 

 
fffi
ffi 	  	 
 
fffi
Fig. 1. Different access control scenarios
– Local Requestor Local Provider
The access requestor is registered in the provider domain.
– External Requestor Local Provider
The access requestor is registered neither in the provider domain nor in any
other domain.
– Local Requestor External Provider
The access requestor is registered in a domain different from the provider
domain.
– External Requestor External Provider
The access requestor who is not registered in any domain requests from
domain D1 for a permission provided by domain D2.
In Section 4, we focus on the second scenario namely, external requestor
local provider. This is because other scenarios are either straightforward or can
be transformed into the second scenario. Later, we will briefly describe what is
the state-of-the-art application of RBAC in other scenarios.
4 Dynamic User-Role Assignment in the External
Requestor Local Provider Scenario
This scenario deals with the problem of remote access control where a stranger
requests for access from the provider domain. Hence, we apply trust management
techniques to issue the requestor a domain-specific timed credential. Using such
a credential, the requestor is assigned to an appropriate role in the provider
domain for a specific time interval. In the following, we describe the assignment
process in detail. It is worth mentioning that in a real scenario the requestor
has the right of choice between different providers. Consequently, the requestor
may also ask the provider to present some credentials. The architecture of this
scenario is depicted in Fig. 2.
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Fig. 2. External user local provider
4.1 Data-Flow Model
1. AAs and PBAs issue attribute certificates and past behavior certificates,
respectively and make them available to both the access requestor and the
provider domain.
2. The access requestor sends a request for access to the ACP.
3. The ACP and the requestor exchange the required credentials. To do so, The
ACP traverses the hierarchical role graph in the provider domain, looking
for the least privileged roles to which the requested permission has been
assigned. Thus, The applied search algorithm is bottom-up Breadth-First
Search (BFS). When one of such roles is found, the ACP asks the requestor
to send the required credentials according to the corresponding user-role
assignment policy defined in RT. Among such credentials is also the past
behavior certificate of the requestor in the corresponding context. If such
certificates satisfy all conditions encapsulated in the policy, the ACP issues
the requestor a domain- specific timed credential. Such a credential, defined
in definition 2, indicates that the requestor is the holder of the correspond-
ing role for a specific time interval. Otherwise, the ACP continues the search
process in the role graph to find the next least privileged role to which the
requested permission has been assigned. In case that there is no more roles
left, the access request is rejected. It is worth mentioning that the ACP also
sends certificates which may be asked for by the requestor. In the following,
we also give the pseudo code for the operations performed by the ACP.
Definition 1. Let T denote a time interval of type [t1, t2], where t1, t2 ∈ R
and t1 ≤ t2.
Definition 2. A domain-specific timed credential is an expression of the
form c [T ], where c is an RT credential of the SimpleMember type and T
is a time interval.
pseudo code for the operations performed by the ACP:
eaten− list = {}, eating − list = {leafnodes}
Until eaten− list = vertices− list
...remove first v and add to eaten− list
...IF the requested permission has been assigned to v
......add all parents and grand parents of v to eaten− list
......ask the requestor to present the required credentials
......IF presented credentials satisfy the corresponding policy
.........assign v to the requestor
.........Break
...ELSE
......add parents of v at the end of eating − list
END UNTIL
4. The ACP returns the decision response and issued credential, if there is any,
to the requestor. The requestor can use this credential for the next access
requests.
5. Both the requestor and the provider domain (ACP) inform the PBA about
the behavior of the other party in the recent transaction. Based on its lo-
cal policies, The PBA uses such information to update the past behavior
certificates of the involved parties.
Example 1. Assume an external access requestor Bob requests to read the his-
tory of the diabetes of patient p1 for which he is receiving cure from hospital A.
The role hierarchy of hospital A is depicted in Fig. 3. In this hierarchy role nurse
is allowed to read the general healthcare information of every patient’s health
record. Roles primaryCarePhysician and highlyQualifiedNurse are autho-
rized to read the history of diseases of every patient’s health record for which
he has received healthcare from hospital A. We have the following set of creden-
tials (HAB is HospitalAccreditationBoard, MPB is MedicalProfessionBoard and
MBA is MedicalBehaviorAuthority):
(1)HAB.accredited← HospitalB
(2)HospitalB.experienced← Bob
(3)MPB.doctor ← Bob
(4)MBA.highTrust← Bob
primaryCare
Physician
medical
Staff
nurse
emergency
Physician
specialist
Physician
highly
Qualified
Nurse
Fig. 3. Role hierarchy in hospital A
When the ACP in hospital A receives the request for access it starts travers-
ing the role hierarchy, looking for the least privileged roles to which the requested
permission has been assigned. The search algorithm is bottom-up Breadth-First
Search (BFS). In this case, the first role which is found is primaryCarePhysician.
Assume membership in such a role is determined by the following policy:
HospitalA.primaryCarePhysician←MPB.doctor ∩
HAB.accredited.experienced ∩ MBA.highTrust
Thus, the ACP asksBob to present the required credentials for role primary−
CarePhysician. When Bob presents all required credentials the ACP matches
them to those in the policy. If all required credentials have been presented, the
ACP issues credential (HospitalA.primaryCarePhysician ← Bob)[T ]. Other-
wise, the ACP repeats the procedure for the next role found in the search process
namely, highlyQualifiedNurse. The time interval for which a domain-specific
timed credential is issued particularly depends on the amount of trust hospital A
puts on access requestor Bob. As long as this credential is valid Bob can present
it for his next requests for access. At the end of this transaction, both Bob and
hospital A inform the MBA about the recent behavior of the other party.
5 Discussion of the Proposed Dynamic User-Role
Assignment
In this section, we discuss the proposed dynamic user-role assignment approach.
In particular, we describe the advantages of the proposed approach compared to
the TrustBAC model.
5.1 Principle of Least Privilege
As we mentioned earlier, in the TrustBAC model strangers are assigned to trust
levels which are assigned to roles. Consequently, a stranger with a certain trust
level becomes a member of all roles assigned to that trust level. This exposes
the system to the risk of granting strangers excessive permissions that they
don’t require for the requested permission. A restrictive approach to address this
issue is not to assign a role to a stranger, but decide about each access request
separately. However, this approach highly degrades the efficiency of the access
control system, as for each request the whole credential exchange phase should
be repeated. Therefore, we apply the open world policy model [8] to temporarily
assign the requestor an appropriate role. This means whenever there is not any
restricting policy, for a specific time interval, the authorized requestor is assigned
to the least privileged role to which the requested permission has been assigned.
This is implemented through a notion of domain-specific timed credential defined
in the previous section. Such a credential can then be used by its holder for the
next access requests. It is worth mentioning that in this way even if the requested
permission is not associated with the presented domain-specific timed credential,
such a credential can simplify both the search process in the role graph and the
credential exchange phase. The search process is simplified because the requested
permission is not associated with any role beneath the one encapsulated in the
presented credential. The credential exchange phase may also be simplified due
to the fact that the requestor is not asked to resend the credentials that he has
already sent to be assigned to the presented domain-specific timed credential.
5.2 Requiring the User to Be Both Qualified and Trusted
In our approach we require the requestor to be both qualified and trusted for
the requested permission (role). This is achieved by composing each user-role
assignment policy in the following form:
A.r ← (c1  c2  .. cn) ∧ PBA.trustLevel where  is logical And/Or.
In this way, the requestor has to present both a set of credentials issued by
different attribute authorities (entities) and the past behavior certificate issued
by the past behavior authority in the relevant context. It is worth mentioning
that past behavior authorities apply their own policies to update the trust level
of both domains and individuals. A past behavior authority in a specific context
updates each party’s trust level either at specific time intervals or after certain
number of transactions.
5.3 Choosing between Different Providers
As we described in the data-flow model of our approach, the access requestor
has the right to choose between different providers. We make this possible by
letting the requestor to ask a provider to send the required credentials, e.g. its
past behavior certificate. If during a running session, the provider domain cannot
meet the criteria of the requestor, the latter can terminate the session and try
another provider domain.
6 Other Access Control Scenarios
In this section we briefly describe the state-of-the- art application of RBAC in
other access control scenarios.
6.1 Local Requestor Local Provider
This scenario deals with the problem of access control in a single domain. Here,
the access requestor is registered in the provider domain and thus, before sending
his request for access he should be properly authenticated. The architecture of
the scenario is depicted in Fig. 4.
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Data-Flow Model
1. The access requestor sends a request for access to the ACP.
2. The ACP evaluates the request against applicable local RBAC policies and
returns the authorization decision to the requestor.
Although in the above scenario the user-role assignment can be performed
automatically, it is more intuitive to use user-role assignment commands issued
by administrators. What makes this scenario different from the external user
local provider scenario is that, regardless of the applied user-role assignment
mechanism, users are registered and identified in the provider domain. Conse-
quently, whenever a new user is assigned to a role, it is considered both qualified
and trusted to hold that role and perform its associated permissions. However,
based on its behavior in the system, each user’s qualifications and trust may
change in the course of time. In order to exercise permissions for which a user
is authorized, it should first be authenticated. Hence, each single activity per-
formed by a user can be logged in the system. Such logs can then be used by the
administrative unit to change the user’s qualifications and/or adjust the amount
of trust given to that user, which may result in the change of his assumed roles.
Example 2. Consider the role hierarchy of hospital A depicted in Fig. 3. When
Alice is assigned any role senior to role primaryCarePhysician she is authorized
to read both the general information and the history of diseases of every patient’s
health record for which he has received healthcare from hospital A. To do so, she
has to first authenticate herself and then activate one of such roles in a running
session with the ACP.
6.2 Local Requestor External Provider
This scenario also deals with the problem of remote access control. However, in
contrast to the scenario described in Sect. 4, here the requestor is registered in a
domain which has a sort of agreement with the provider domain. This means that
the requestor is already a member of some roles in a domain which is recognized
by the provider domain. Here, an existing technique is to use a role mapping
table which maps the requestor’s role to a role in the provider domain [15]. The
architecture of the scenario is depicted in Fig. 5.
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Fig. 5. Local user external provider
Data-Flow Model
1. The access requestor sends the request for access to the ACP of the provider
domain.
2. The ACP of the provider domain asks for one of the required roles in the
requestor domain that the requestor must be a member of. The ACP finds
such roles by traversing its hierarchical role graph, looking for the least
privileged roles to which the requested permission has been assigned. When
one of such roles is found, the ACP looks up its role mapping table to
determine the corresponding role(s) in the requestor domain. If the requested
permission is associated with none of the roles in the provider domain the
request is rejected.
3. The ACP of the requestor domain returns one of the roles asked by the ACP
of the provider domain.
4. The ACP returns the decision response to the access requestor.
Example 3. Assume an access requestor Bob registered in hospital B requests
to read brain MRI images of patient p2 taken in hospital A. Bob has been as-
signed role emergencyPhysician in the role hierarchy of hospital B, depicted
in Fig. 6. Based on the local policies of hospital A this permission is associ-
ated to roles emergencyPhysician and specialistPhysician (Fig. 3). Assume
that Table 1 shows a part of role mapping table in hospital A. The ACP of
hospital A searches this table looking for the roles in hospital B which corre-
spond to emergencyPhysician. Hence, the ACP of hospital A asks the ACP
of hospital B to send credential HospitalB.emergencyPhysician for Bob. The
ACP of hospital B then sends credential HospitalB.emergencyPhysician ←
Bob which results in granting access to Bob. If Bob is not a member of role
HospitalB.emergencyPhysician the ACP of hospital A asks for the role corre-
sponding to specialistPhysician which is HospitalB.surgeon.
Table 1. Role mapping table in hospital A
External Role External Do-
main
Local Role
nurse HospitalB nurse
physician HospitalB primaryCarePhysician
headNurse HospitalB highlyQualifiedNurse
emergencyPhysician HospitalB emergencyPhysician
surgeon HospitalB specialistPhysician
6.3 External Requestor External Provider
This scenario is similar to the one described in Sect. 4, external user local
provider. However, here an external user asks a local provider to access a re-
source which belongs to another domain. Consequently, the first domain D1
emergency
Physician
physician
healthCare
Provider
nurse
headNursesurgeon
Fig. 6. Role hierarchy in hospital B
asks the requestor to send his request to the actual provider domain D2 which
is then handled in the same way as the one presented in example 1.
Example 4. Assume an external access requestor Bob sends his request to hos-
pital B to read the history of the diabetes of patient p1 for which he is receiving
cure from hospital A. In this case, hospital B, tells Bob to send his request to
hospital A, which is then processed in the same way as the one given in Sect. 4.
7 Conclusion
In this paper first we give a systematic overview of the different possible access
control scenarios where the requester can be inside or outside of the provider
domain. Then, integrating RBAC with RT, we present a new automatic user-role
assignment approach for the scenario where a stranger requests for access from
a provider domain. Our proposed approach has two main advantages compared
to the existing dynamic user-role assignment techniques. First, we introduce and
address the principle of least privilege. Second, we assign a stranger to a role in
such a way that he must be both qualified and trusted for that role.
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